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Multinational enterprises (MNEs) need to understand and handle various informal institutions in host countries 
to survive and succeed. How MNEs effectively manage informal institutional characteristics of host countries 
is an important question for both practitioners and scholars. This paper addresses this important but neglected 
topic based on an in-depth longitudinal qualitative study. It identifies some key informal institutions in Australia, 
examines how such institutional distinctiveness shapes the behaviour of Chinese expatriates and MNEs and 
how they handle such informal institutional differences between China and Australia. Our findings challenge 
some taken-for-granted assumptions regarding informal institutions in the literature and demonstrate that 








According to institutionalism, organizations operate in the web of various intertwined institutions 
spun by social actors (Scott,2013). It is a consensus view that institutions matter. Institutional networks 
structure opportunities, generate social expectations and incentives, shape human behaviour and 
interaction, and determine transaction costs (North, 1990). Failing to comprehend institutions 
adequately and accurately could be costly for both individuals and organizations. 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) investing outside home countries as a ‘stranger in a strange land’ 
(Heilein,1961), need to comprehend and handle various formal and informal institutions so as to 
survive and succeed. Therefore, how MNEs effectively respond to and strategically manage formal and 
informal institutional characteristics of host countries is a central question for both practitioners and 
scholars. For that reason, scholars have shown a growing interest in institutional environment and 
how MNEs deal with the complex institutional context when operating overseas (e.g., Allen, Allen, & 
Lange, 2018; Regnér & Edman, 2014). 
Nevertheless, comprehending formal and informal institutions of host countries can be a 
challenging task for MNEs. As North (1990, p.107) has noted, it might be less challenging to be precise 
about formal written rules, but it is not easy to be precise about informal institutions since we cannot 
see or touch such deep ‘constructs of the human mind.’ Given the tacit nature of informal institutions, 
it is not easy to identify, interpret, and measure them adequately and precisely (Sartor & Beamish,2014; 




Wang, Lu, Soderlund, & Chen,2018).In recent decades, scholars have paid more attention to the 
relationship between formal institutions (e.g., property rights, rule of law, and anti-trust regulation, 
etc.)and MNEs, but the relationship between informal institutions and MNEs has not attracted enough 
attention (Dau, Chacar, Lyles, & Li,2018; Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008; Regnér & Edman, 2014; Sartor 
& Beamish, 2014; Seyoum, 2011). Although the existing MNE literature is full of studies on cultures, 
culture and informal institution are not an identical construct (Dau et al., 2018; Helmke & Levitsky, 
2004, 2006; Redding, 2008; Seyoum, 2011). Consequently, since informal institution becomes tangled 
up with culture in the mainstream MNE literature, there are gaps in our understanding of the 
relationship between informal institution and MNEs. We do not have enough knowledge regarding 
the interactions between informal institutions and enterprise-level strategies of MNEs. How informal 
institutions shape the behaviour of MNEs and how MNEs respond to informal institutional variations 
in host countries have not been well understood (Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008; Regnér & Edman, 
2014; Seyoum, 2011). However, informal institutions, as “rules in force” (Ostrom, 2005), structure social 
expectations and significantly shape business activities and transaction costs (Sartor & Beamish, 2014). 
Both formal and informal institutions should be comprehensively integrated into the mainstream 
management studies (Wang et al., 2018).  
The void in the literature informs this study to explore how MNEs learn to navigate the web of 
informal institutions in host countries so as to advance our understanding of interactions between 
informal institutions and MNEs. Differing from the mainstream MNE literature satisfied with examining 
the relationship between cultures and MNEs, this study goes beyond national cultures into informal 
institutions. It is also among limited MNE studies that empirically identify informal institutions of a host 
country and examine coping strategies of expatriates and MNEs. This enables our research to 
contribute to the literature in terms of both theoretical and practical implications.  
Given that research on the internationalization of emerging economy multinational enterprises 
(EMNEs) is still in its infancy, the post-entry internationalization process of EMNEs has not received 
enough attention (Luo & Zhang, 2016), it remains unclear how EMNEs handle informal institutions in 
host countries, especially in developed economies (Klossek, Linke, &Nippa,2012). Therefore, based on 
an in-depth longitudinal qualitative study, this paper empirically examines the interaction of EMNEs 
(Chinese MNEs) investing in a developed country (Australia) with local informal institutional 
characteristics through exploring the following questions: 
 
1. What are the major Australian informal institutions that shape the relationship between MNEs 
and local major stakeholders?  
2. How do Chinese MNEs and their expatriates handle the informal institutional characteristics in 
Australia? 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section two discusses the existing 
understanding of informal institutions and the relationships between formal and informal constraints, 
aiming to clarify the concept of informal institution. Section three elaborates on the existing studies 
on the relationship between informal institutions and MNEs, aspiring to make clear the trends and 
gaps in the literature. Section four discusses the methodological approach to data collection and 
analysis. Sections five and six present our findings of major Australian informal institutions and how 
Chinese MNEs manage the informal institutional environment. The paper is concluded by discussing 









CLARIFYING INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
Institution is a widely used concept with different interpretations in the social sciences (Scott, 2013). 
For North (1991, p.97), institutions are “rules of the game”; for Orr and Scott (2008, p.565), institutions 
are “symbolic frameworks that provide guidelines for behaviour, and lend stability, regularity, and 
meaning to social life”; whereas Huntington (1969, p.12) defines institutions as “stable, valued, 
recurring patterns of behaviour”. 
Institutions as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction” involve both formal and informal rules (North, 1990, p.97; Wang et al., 2018). Usually, 
formal institutions such as laws and regulations are consciously designed written rules enforced by 
the state; while informal institutions such as customs and patterns of action are usually tacit, taken for 
granted, and unconsciously followed (Zhang, 2016). Format (written or unwritten), design 
(consciously designed or unconsciously formed), and enforcement mechanism (enforced officially or 
non-officially) are major criteria used to draw a line between formal and informal institutions. 
Therefore, Helmke and Levitsky (2004, p.727) define informal institutions as “socially shared rules, 
usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned 
channels”. 
In the literature, the term informal institution has been applied to various non-codified and 
nonofficial phenomena such as taboos, customs, traditions, codes of conduct, civil society, routines, 
patterns of action, and national culture, among others (Levitsky & Helmke, 2006; North, 1991; Seyoum, 
2011). Therefore, Helmke and Levitsky (2004; 2006) warn that writers should not treat informal 
institution as “a residual category” used to describe any behavioural regularity. A behavioural 
regularity can be viewed as an institution only if it is rooted in shared expectations of appropriate 
behaviour and rule-bound, that is, not following the pattern will trigger some kind of social sanction 
(Knight, 1992; Levitsky&Helmke,2006).     
Helmke and Levitsky (2006, pp.13-18) identified four types of informal institutions based on the 
relationship of formal and informal institutions: complementary, accommodating, competing, and 
substitutive. Complementary informal institutions are those filling in gaps of formal institutions or 
urging people to comply with formal rules. Accommodating informal institutions generate incentives 
for actors to pursue alternative ways without directly violating the formal rules. Competing informal 
institutions encourage actors to act in ways different from what is expected by the formal constraints; 
whereas substitutive informal institutions emerge where formal rules are ineffective. Such a 
classification is based on some hidden assumptions: 1) informal institutions are less important than 
formal rules; 2) informal institutions only serve as a subsidiary which fills gaps of formal regulations or 
modifies formal rules; 3) informal institutions emerge only when formal rules are ineffective; and, 4) 
informal institutions function well only when the formal institutional environment is weak and 
unsuccessful. However, these hidden assumptions remain controversial given the shortage of 
empirical evidence. Our study hopes to testify whether such assumptions are tenable or not based on 
qualitative findings.  
Among the various debates on informal institutions, perhaps the most controversial issue is the 
relationship between the concepts of informal institution and national culture. There are several 
competing understandings regarding this relationship. Some scholars view national culture as a major 
content of a country’s informal institutions (Pejovich, 1999); some view informal institution and 
national culture are identical concepts (e.g., Alesina & Giuliano, 2015; Filiou & Golesorkhi, 2016). By 
contrast, some authors believe that these two terms are not synonymous but have a causal 
relationship (Redding, 2008). For example, Helmke and Levitsky (2004; 2006) argue that informal 
institutions are norms, whereas national cultures are shared values. Norms rooted in shared beliefs 
might have a cultural source or have nothing to do with national cultures. National cultures can 




generate, reinforce, or undermine certain unofficial constraints (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006). A country’s 
national culture is only one of the sources of its informal institutions, political systems and laws are 
also sources of informal rules. Therefore, countries with a similar national culture (e.g., North and 
South Korea) may have different informal institutions, constituting noticeable country differences. 
Redding (2008) draws a clear line between culture and institution. According to Redding (2008, 
p.266), culture and institution belong to different realms. Culture is the world of ideas while 
institutions are the world of order. In other words, culture as logics of action belongs to “the realm of 
meaning and interpretation”, while institutions are “rules of the game in the field of social action” 
(Redding, 2008, p.261). As “systems of meaning” which help people make sense of their surroundings, 
culture is at a deep layer and does not directly determine human action. By contrast, as rules, norms, 
and stable patterns of action, institutions are at the surface and shape human action (Redding, 2008, 
p.266). For example, reciprocity as a belief is a Chinese business culture, while guanxi (connections) as 
a behaviour pattern constitutes an informal institution. Reciprocity can be used to justify guanxi, but 
it is not guanxi. Culture provides meaning for institutions but not institutions. Moreover, culture and 
institutions can “be a close match or a serious mismatch” (Redding, 2008, p.267). Therefore, 
understanding cultural differences cannot ensure expatriates of MNEs to adequately understand the 
informal institutional differences between host and home countries. This might be one of the major 
reasons why cross-cultural training tends to be less effective and expatriate failure rates remain 
appallingly high. Understanding institutional differences, especially country differences of informal 
institutions, is essential for MNEs to correctly interpret host country markets.  
 
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AND MNES 
 
As an integral component of the institutional environment, informal institutions of a host country 
matter a lot for MNEs operating in that nation. Firstly, without a better understanding of the informal 
institutions in a host country, an MNE cannot precisely comprehend and interpret its institutional 
environment. For example, the Constitution of some countries in the world such as the Republic of 
Philippines and Mexico is very similar to that of the United States (Maddex, 1996). However, given the 
different informal institutions, the business environment of these countries is more different than we 
have expected. Even countries such as Canada and the U.S. who share language, historical and legal 
traditions also have profound differences in terms of informal institutions and business environments 
(Petersen & Pedersen, 2002). Moreover, scholars believe that MNE subsidiaries without a better 
understanding of host country institutions will encounter a higher degree of liabilities of foreignness, 
i.e., additional costs incurred by foreign firms due to unfamiliarity and discrimination that local firms 
never face (Mallon & Fainshmidt, 2017; Zaheer, 1995). Unfamiliarity places MNEs at an informational 
disadvantage, makes them fail to follow local institutions or violate local expectations unintentionally 
(Joardar & Wu, 2011). According to social identity theory, MNEs failing to follow local norms or meet 
local expectations are more likely to be viewed as outsiders, and are more difficult to earn legitimacy 
and social support in host countries. Therefore, having a better understanding of local informal 
institutions is very important for MNEs to avoid embarrassing misunderstanding and missteps (Joardar 
& Wu, 2011). However, the relationship between informal institutions and MNEs has not received 
enough scholarly attention (Dau et al., 2018; Seyoum,2011). 
An extensive literature review reveals that research on the relationship between informal 
institutions and MNEs has been dominated by two efforts: examining the institutional profile effect 
and the cultural/psychic/institutional distance effect on foreign direct investment (FDI) and MNE 
strategies (Dow et al., 2016; Van Hoorn & Maseland, 2016). Studies focusing on institutional profile 
effects tend to choose one or several variables to represent the informal institutional environment in 
a host country. For example, when examining the international expansion of firms, Deng and 




colleagues (2009) identify Guanxi (a firm’s network of relationships in a host country) as a dominant 
informal institution which is significantly associated with the level of FDI.  
By contrast, studies focusing on cultural/psychic/institutional distance effects shift their attention 
from institutional characteristics of host countries to the differences between home and host 
countries. The early literature focuses on the role of cultural distance in international business (Estrin, 
Baghdasaryan, & Meyer,2009). Cultural distance refers to the difference between two countries in 
terms of cultural values. However, adopting cultural distance as the proxy of cross-country differences 
has received many criticisms since this construct has both theoretical and methodological limitations 
(Shenkar,2012). Some writers believe that relying on cultural distance to capture country differences 
is overly simplistic (Beugelsdijk, Kostova, Kunst, Spadafora, & van Essen,2018). Shenkar (2012) argues 
that the cultural distance construct has some hidden assumptions without the support of logic or 
empirical evidence. One of the hidden assumptions of this construct is that the perceived cultural 
distance from the home country to the host country is identical to the perceived cultural distance from 
the host country to the home country of MNEs. However, there is no evidence that people in home 
and host countries perceive the cultural differences in the same way (Shenkar,2012).  
Given the limitations of using culture as the proxy for country differences, the Uppsala 
internationalization school introduces the concept of psychic distance to capture perceived country 
differences (Alastair, Coldwell, & Joosub,2018). Psychic distance refers to “the sum of factors 
preventing or disturbing the flows of information between firms and markets” (Johanson & 
Wiedersheim Paul, 1975, p.308).Such factors include language, culture, religion, education, industrial 
development, political system, time zones, and the like (Blomkvist & Drogendijk, 2013). However, 
psychic distance has been criticized since it is difficult to measure and its usage is arbitrary in nature 
(Alastair et al., 2018). Moreover, similar with the issue of cultural distance, psychic distance 
perceptions between countries are also not symmetric (Håkanson, 2014). 
Since the mid-1990s, scholars have explored to understand country differences based on the 
concept of institutional distance that refers to “the extent of difference/similarity between the 
regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutions of two or more institutional environments” (Kostova, 
1996, p.30). Studies on institutional distance and MNEs reveal that institutional distance between 
countries matters (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Research findings demonstrate that the larger the 
institutional distance between home and host countries, the more difficult for MNEs to obtain local 
legitimacy and transfer home country practices, and the higher the adaptation cost for MNEs (Cezar 
& Escobar, 2015). However, how institutional distance matters is still less clear and has not been well 
understood (Fortwengel, 2017; Van Hoorn & Maseland, 2016).  
Given that research on the relationship between institutions and MNEs has been dominated by 
examining the effects of institutional distance on FDI and MNEs, correspondingly, this stream of 
research has been dominated by variable-based large-N studies where institutions and institutional 
differences are just examined as abstract “variables” (Fortwengel, 2017; Jackson & Deeg, 2008).Such 
a research method might miss “a number of potentially important explanations of how and why 
exactly the particular institutional distance between two countries matters” (Fortwengel, 2017, 
p.798). In practice, MNEs are “shaped by the nature and interactions between particular home and 
host country institutions” (Jackson & Deeg, 2008, p.541), not just by the institutional differences. The 
variable-based method might miss important ways in which institutions shape MNEs and MNEs 
respond to institutional environments. Therefore, more qualitative studies are necessary so as to 
obtain a better understanding of the relationship between institutions and MNEs (Fortwengel, 2017), 
especially the interactions between informal institutions and emerging economy MNEs.  
 
 






The research questions of this study justify that a qualitative method is appropriate to address our 
inquiries. Since case studies “represent a methodology that is ideally suited to creating managerially 
relevant knowledge” (Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008, p.1465), this research utilizes a longitudinal, 
multiple case design to obtain a comprehensive understanding of interactions between informal 
institutions and MNEs, specifically, the interactions between informal institutions in Australia and 
EMNEs from China.  
Australia is selected as the context of this empirical study for two reasons. First, Australia has been 
one of the top direct investment destinations for Chinese MNEs in the recent decade. Since 2013, China 
has overtaken the US and become the largest source of approved foreign investment (The FIRB 
report, 2017). Second, Australia is different from China on many dimensions such as history, culture, 
and the economic and political systems. Given these striking differences, it is more likely for Chinese 
MNEs to encounter unfamiliar informal institutions. Hence, Australia constitutes an ideal context to 
examine how Chinese MNEs interact with local informal institutions. 
Following strategies proposed by Yin (2009) and Patton (2002), case firms were selected based on 
several criteria. First, the case MNE should be information-rich so that authors “can learn a great deal 
about matters of importance” (Patton,2002, p.169). Therefore, case firms should be a subsidiary, have 
both Chinese expatriates and local employees, and have operated in Australia for at least one year so 
that Chinese expatriates should have some sort of close contact with local governments, communities, 
and employees, and hence have encountered some kinds of local informal norms, routines, and 
patterns of action. Second, case firms should come from different industries including mining, 
manufacturing, and energy industries so as to ensure a representative sample. According to 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Thomas (2004), when a multiple case design is desirable, four to ten cases are 
sufficient. Therefore, we chose eight case firms that were denoted by MNE1 to MNE8 to ensure 
anonymity and the case profiles are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Profile of Case Chinese MNEs and Interviewees 
Case 










MNE1 Mining Listed company 2006 68 Greenfield 7 
MNE2 Energy SOE 2008 12 Greenfield 4 
MNE3 Mineral resource SOE 2009 15 M&A 3 
MNE4 Mining POE 2008 10 Greenfield 2 
MNE5 Manufacturing Listed company 2007 75 JV 7 
MNE6 Coal & coal chemical 
Listed 
company 2004 18 M&A 8 
MNE7 Mining SOE 2009 9 M&A 5 
MNE8 Metallurgical SOE 2008 16 Greenfield 6 
Total      42 
Notes: SOE: State-owned enterprise; POE: Private-owned enterprise; JV: Joint venture; and M&A: Mergers and 
acquisitions.  
 




Since case studies are often criticized for the lack of methodological rigor (Thomas,2004), this study 
followed the procedures suggested by Gibbert et al. (2008) to strengthen the validity and reliability of 
our research. For example, to improve internal validity, multiple interviews were conducted with 
Chinese expatriates who had worked in their Australian subsidiaries for at least one year. Key 
informants were interviewed several times face to face or by phone to ensure consistency. Multiple 
cases and multiple interviews enable us to examine a phenomenon from different perspectives. To 
enhance construct validity, we exercised due diligence to obtain information from different data 
sources. We collected data through semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, and 
documentation. Online resources including media news were also collected to triangulate our 
empirical data. The external validity was boosted by our multiple case studies (Gibbert et al., 2008). 
Procedures were also adopted to address the issue of reliability. We chose a longitudinal research 
design; prepared a case study protocol to guide our field work; and ensured that at least two 
researchers participated in interviews and focus group discussions (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Interviews and focus group discussions were conducted from 2012 to 2017. Within these years, 
many fieldwork trips were arranged in major cities of Australia (such as Darwin, Perth, Sydney, and 
Melbourne) for data collection. During the interviews and focus group discussions, we asked 
participants to describe distinctive local norms, customs, and patterns of action they encountered in 
Australia; the possible influence on their companies; and how Chinese MNEs handle such local norms 
and patterned business practices. The interviews and focus group discussions usually ranged from 60 
to 120 minutes. A total of 42 Chinese expatriates in the eight case MNEs were interviewed including 
CEOs, general managers, board members, executive assistants, and heads of departments. The profile 
of the interviewees is summarized in Table 1. 
Data were analyzed utilizing methods proposed by Charmaz (2014). In order to dig out the different 
layers of meaning in the data, notes of interviews and focus group discussions were coded by at least 
two researchers following the three steps: initial coding, focused coding, and theoretical coding 
(Charmaz, 2014). During initial coding, chunks of data were labelled by each researcher based on the 
meaning identified from the data. After reaching an agreement among researchers about the initial 
codes, we moved to focused coding to understand the relationships of initial codes and identify 
dominant categories. During theoretical coding, we identified themes and concepts to capture 
theoretical connections and ideas. During the coding process, we followed the constant comparative 
method to understand similarities, differences, and patterns in the data (Charmaz, 2014). To enhance 
construct validity, we compared our data with the literature to identify a coherent explanation. This 
usually led to additional data collection and further analysis. Through memo-writing and comparing 
the themes emerging from the data with the literature, this study identified some informal local 
institutional characteristics, their effects on MNEs, and strategies of Chinese MNEs towards such 
informal institutions. The findings and tentative arguments were checked by key informants to 
















Table 2. Examples of the Coding Process 




relationship is completely different 
from that in China 
•Governments have the 
responsibility to help companies 
•It is impossible for the Australian 
government to bend their visa 
policies for a foreign firm 
•The relationship between 

























•CSR adoption is generally voluntary 
•Doing good to earn a good 
reputation is not true kindness 
•Not enough for an MNE to 




•A new type of CSR 
 
•The standards-based CSR 
 







•Chinese workers are ready to work 
overtime 
•Working beyond the normal 
working hours is the exception, not 
the norm 
•Stop working immediately when it 
is time for them to go home 
•Local workers refuse working extra 







overtime & work-life 
balance 
 
• Companies as the family 
of employees 
 













AUSTRALIAN INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS PERCEIVED BY CHINESE MNES 
 
MNEs may encounter various socially endorsed norms of behaviour in host countries. To make our 
research manageable, this paper only focused on some major local informal institutional 
characteristics that shape the relationship between Chinese MNEs and key Australian stakeholders 
such as government, local communities, and employees. Apart from formal rules such as labour 
regulations and environment laws, the tacit socially shared norms also shape the expectations and 
behaviour of MNEs and their local stakeholders. The following are some distinctive informal 
institutions identified by this research. 
 
THE UNIVERSALISTIC GOVERNMENT-ENTERPRISE RELATIONSHIP 
 
A universalistic government-enterprise relationship refers to a rule-based and impersonal relationship 
where regulations, in any situations, are applied to all firms without much flexibility. It is the opposite 
of a particularistic government-enterprise relationship which can be found in China where policy 
implementation might be shaped by specific situations and relationships. Since such a universalistic 
government-enterprise relationship is prevalent and widely accepted as appropriate and desirable in 




Australia, it can be considered as institutional. Government officials failing to follow such a 
universalistic principle may invite public criticism. Such a government-enterprise relationship has its 
cultural sources since China has a particularistic national culture whereas Australia has a universalistic 
national culture (Stone & Stone-Romero, 2008). Such a norm also has its roots in official regulations 
and laws and thus it is easily mistaken for a formal institution. The difference in terms of the 
government-enterprise relationship is one of major institutional distinctions between China and 
Australia. The executive chairman of MNE1 described how such a universalistic norm of government-
enterprise relationship looked like and influenced the implementation of government policies, 
 
According to the official regulations and laws of China and Australia, government and 
enterprises should have an impersonal relationship in both countries. However, I find the 
government-enterprise relationship in Australia is completely different [from that in China]. In 
China, government has the responsibility to help companies within their jurisdiction. If a 
company encounters serious difficulties, it is natural for them to turn to government for help. 
Local governments are also happy to help them so as to boost the local economy. But in 
Australia, government agencies only formulate and follow rules. It is impossible for them to 
make an exception to rules in order to resolve issues of specific companies […] Our project has 
suffered from serious delays and overspends in recent years. So we appeal to the Australian 
government, hoping it allows us to bring more Chinese skilled workers to speed up construction 
and reduce costs. However, they refuse to do so. 
 
This sentiment was echoed by the deputy manager of MNE7, 
 
One of our projects is located around five hundred miles from here [a large Australian city]. The 
village life of our expatriates working there is too harsh. So the parent company decides to send 
several Chinese chefs there to improve the quality of life. However, the chefs cannot get a visa 
since the Australian government insists that these chefs should take an IELTS test. Is a good 
command of English necessary for such a position? Is it possible that a Chinese chef with English 
skills is willing to work in that remote area? However, it is impossible for the Australian 
government to bend their policies for a firm. In China, the response of the government will be 
different… The government will help us following the norm which fixing special issues with 
special methods. 
 
THE RIGHTS-BASED CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) 
 
According to McWilliams and Siegel (2000, p.117), CSR refers to “voluntary corporate practices aimed 
at furthering social goods, beyond the interest of the firm and that which is required by law”. Rathert 
(2016, p.860) groups CSR into two distinct categories: standards-based CSR which firms used to meet 
the minimum legal requirements, and rights-based CSR which firms used to address expectations of 
stakeholders and defines the rights-based CSR as “a set of discretionary social practices addressing 
stakeholder expectations related to the organizational implementation of legal rules and social 
norms”. Although various definitions of CSR emphasize its voluntary nature as “a form of private 
governance” (Rathert, 2016, p.860), CSR nowadays has actually, in many developed economies 
including Australia, evolved into a strong informal institution that shape social expectations of 
stakeholders regarding companies, especially MNEs. MNEs nowadays are facing more pressure to 
engage in CSR initiatives in host countries, particularly in countries with a strong institutional 
environment which authorizes stakeholders to ‘demand’ CSR behaviour from companies. 
Consequently, MNEs are required to undertake more CSR activities to meet the expectations of local 




stakeholders so as to obtain legitimacy. Many MNEs utilize CSR adoption as a signaling strategy to 
demonstrate their commitment to local stakeholders and reduce the liability of foreignness (Campbell, 
2007; Rathert, 2016). When discussing the CSR adoption of Chinese MNEs, one manager of MNE4 
explained, 
 
In China, CSR adoption is generally voluntary for companies without a high-profile name. But in 
Australia, everyone in the local community knows that you are a foreign company and wants us 
to contribute more. In order to build a good relationship [with the local community], foreign 
companies usually conduct more CSR activities than local firms […] It is not enough for a foreign 
company contributes just the same as a local company if it wants to earn enough local support. 
 
The deputy manager of MNE5 offered a similar comment, 
 
In China, usually companies deal only with local governments, not the local community. But in 
Australia, a foreign company must make the local community happy, not the government. In 
order to earn local support, our company has invested a lot in the regional health, education, 
and youth programs […] Local people have a high expectation [of foreign firms]. Some people 
often say that Chinese companies have money and should help us do this and do that. However, 
we are a commercial company and must survive economically […] what is the scope of the social 
responsibility for foreign firms? 
 
THE NORM OF ZERO-MINUTE OVERTIME  
 
Shaped by the collectivist culture and the paternalist tradition, managers in China hope employees to 
treat the company as their family and go all out for their work. Working overtime tends to be viewed 
as an indicator of organizational commitment and is quite common in the Chinese workplace. Apart 
from employing overtime work as a strategy of impression management, Chinese employees usually 
cannot refuse to work overtime if managers ask them to do so, although the government regulations 
in China also have strict limits on overtime. If they are paid for overtime work, many Chinese employees 
are happy to work overtime. 
By contrast, in Australia, working overtime is less common. This is not the result of the Australian 
formal institutions since labor regulations in both countries set strict limits on overtime. It is mainly 
the work-life balance preference shared by most Australian organizations and workers. This does not 
mean that Australian people never work extra time, but working beyond the normal working hours is 
the exception, not the norm. Chinese expatriates tend to be very impressed by this work norm. One 
board officer of MNE1 told the researchers, 
 
When our company prepared the feasibility report of this Australian project, the team ignored 
the local work norms and assumed that Australian employees are flexible as Chinese workers in 
terms of working hours and are ready to work overtime. However, we soon find that local 
workers refuse to work extra minutes, let alone extra hours, even if the project has been serious 
delayed and we promise to pay them at a higher rate. 
 
The Office manager in MNE3 felt the same way, 
 
The working hours of our company are from 9am to 5pm. If you visit an office of local employees 
at, say, 5:05pm, you usually cannot find anyone […] You can only find Chinese expatriates in the 
company after business hours […] I heard a story that local workers are making some pre-made 




parts using cement and sand. They stop working immediately when it is time for them to go 
home, leaving some pre-made cement parts unfinished and hence ruined. Although it is 
estimated that they can finish the job if they work overtime for just five to twenty minutes, they 
refuse to do so. […] I also read a news report that a local employee sued her boss for 500 
thousand dollars because the boss made her work overtime for one to six minutes for around 
twenty times during her six-month job. It is unbelievable in China. 
 
Such a norm of ‘zero-minute overtime’ in the Australian workplace cannot be explained just by 
labor regulations. It is a workplace routine that local employees strictly protect the boundary of work 
and life. 
 
SAFETY AND HEALTH FIRST IN THE WORKPLACE, NOT EFFICIENCY 
 
All Chinese expatriates interviewed were impressed by how work is carried out in a safe manner in the 
Australian workplace. In most cases, Australian employees try their best to carry out responsibilities in 
a safe and secure way, although efficiency could be sacrificed. Giving workplace safety and health the 
highest priority has become a workplace convention in Australia. On the surface, this is because 
Australia has comprehensive work health and safety (WHS) laws. However, many countries have 
similar regulations but have not achieved a similar level of workplace safety. As one manager of MNE6 
commented, 
 
It is difficult to say that safety regulations in China are not comprehensive and strict. Many 
Chinese companies also attach great importance to workplace safety but many of them have 
failed to minimize unsafe workplace behaviour. Safety managers in China often wonder why 
unsafe behaviour cannot be eliminated in their companies. 
 
The Managing Director of MNE2 was impressed by this Australian work norm, 
 
The Australian culture seems incredibly relaxed and Australian people are seemingly very laid 
back[…] However, in the workplace, they are meticulous workers and extraordinarily 
professional, prefer quality [over quantity], and strictly follow various regulations […] A project 
which can be done within one year in China might take three years in Australia, but the quality 
is good and the accident rate is extremely low.  
 
One manager of MNE5 explained his judgment, 
 
I have been thinking about this for a long time. The good WHS in Australia is not just the result 
of laws and regulations enforced by government. The major reason is that the whole society, 
not just government, has taken workplace health and safety seriously […] Apart from WHS laws, 
every industry has codes of conduct to promote best practices and guide employees how to 
work safely. Every organization also has health and well-being programs of their own to ensure 
the health and safety of employees. These codes of conduct and organizational programs are 
not legally enforceable, but people follow them strictly […] The WHS laws are not just laws; 
they have developed into routines and habits of Australian organizations and employees. 
 
The four informal institutions identified in this study have their cultural or legal roots. They are 
derived from and shaped by national culture or regulations. Therefore, they are easily viewed as 
cultural or legal characteristics. However, according to Redding (2008), culture belongs to “the world 




of ideas” which helps people make sense of their surroundings but does not determine behaviour, 
while institutions belong to “the world of order” and directly determine human action. These 
identified characteristics have definitely gone beyond “the realm of ideas” and turned into shared 
ways of behaving and accepted “rules of the game” in Australia. In this study, universalism as a belief 
constitutes a cultural dimension. It generates and justifies the impersonal and universalistic 
government-enterprise relationship which as a behaviour pattern constitutes an informal institution. 
Similarly, work-life balance as an idea generates and justifies the zero-minute overtime norm; while 
the no-overtime norm as a behaviour pattern constitutes an informal institution which directly 
determines workplace behaviour. The safety and health first in the workplace and the rights-based 
CSR are not just values and beliefs but have become accepted pattered behaviour. It is necessary to 
single out such informal institutions; otherwise they might be ignored or marginalised in studies on 
national cultures and the cross-cultural training programs of MNEs.  
 
STRATEGIES OF CHINESE EXPATRIATES AND MNES TOWARDS LOCAL INFORMAL 
INSTITUTIONS 
 
The four informal institutions identified in this study lay the foundation for our analysis of the coping 
strategies of Chinese MNEs and their expatriates. How to deal with informal institutional differences 
between home and host countries to avoid misunderstanding and missteps is a challenge for Chinese 
expatriates and MNEs without rich international experience. In the fieldwork, we found that local 
institutional characteristics had significantly shaped the behaviour of Chinese expatriates and 
strategies of Chinese MNEs. Confronting local norms and customs that influence the expectations and 
behaviour of stakeholders, Chinese expatriates and MNEs had gradually become less confused and 
developed some strategies to address such institutional differences. 
 
FROM COMPLAINING TO RESPECTING DIFFERENCES 
 
Our longitudinal study had identified a clear change of the attitude of Chinese expatriates towards 
local norms. In the early interviews, it was more likely to hear complaints from Chinese managers, 
especially those newcomers. Later interviews indicated that most informants had changed their 
attitude and developed positive views about different local work norms. As the executive chairman of 
MNE1 explained, 
 
In the beginning, there are some complaints that the Australian government is indifferent 
towards foreign firms and refuses to help us out. Now we understand that such a government-
enterprise relationship is just different from ours and not entirely bad. [In China], a good 
relationship with government agencies is very important for companies. If a company is 
important and has a good relationship with a government agency, sometimes a government 
agency might make an exception for the company. Therefore, companies in China have invested 
a lot of time and energy to build relationships with government officials […] But in Australia, 
things are simple. You know government agencies will never change rules to help your 
company. There is no need for companies to invest much time and energy to build relationships 









An assistant manager of MNE3 also expressed her understanding of the norm of zero-minute 
overtime and did not agree to link working overtime with the level of organizational commitment, 
 
I view it just as a different work norm. Chinese companies usually hope employees to treat the 
company as their family and invest all their time into work, including their spare time when 
needed […] People here pursue work-life balance and quality of life […] This just reflects the 
difference in terms of how central work is [in people’s life]. It is difficult to say which one is 
better. 
 
Our fieldwork found that most Chinese expatriates had gradually gotten used to the country 
differences and handle the differences in a positive way. One method adopted by Chinese expatriates 
was to communicate honestly since they believed that communication is king. Several expatriates 
interviewed told the researchers that they handle country differences very well through open and 
honest communication, as the manager of MNE3 commented, 
 
Nowadays you can find institutional differences anywhere; even within one large country. […] I 
do not consider such differences are challenging and difficult to deal with. For me, if I do not 
know or understand something, I just tell local colleagues that I do not know this as I am a 
foreigner and ask them to give me suggestions. 
 
FROM SUSPICION TO LEARNING WITH AN OPEN MIND  
 
In the early discussions with informants, we found that some Chinese expatriate managers did not 
fully agree with certain local work norms. They doubted whether such work norms were sustainable 
since they seemed to be detrimental to efficiency. In the interviews of the following years, we found 
that the doubt had largely disappeared and, in some cases, Chinese MNEs wanted to implant the same 
work norms in their parent companies. As one mine manager of MNE6 explained, 
 
We have talked about many country differences between China and Australia [...] To speak 
frankly, in the beginning, we do not like the no-overtime norm and some work procedures 
followed by local employees. They seem to be too rigid and lack efficiency. But now our patent 
company is learning these workplace norms, they also want to turn the safety regulations into 
routines of all employees to minimize the unsafe individual behaviour in the workplace.  
 
Our fieldwork found that all case firms had attached importance to learning. Headquarters often 
sent staff to their Australian subsidiaries for training and accumulating international experience; 
subsidiaries also arranged local staff to work or attend training programs at headquarters. As a board 
officer of MNE6 had commented, 
 
From the perspective of efficiency, rigid regulations might be not desirable. But sometimes 
hypercorrection is necessary […] It is good practice not to cut corners and bend safety 
procedures for efficiency. We like these workplace norms now and promote them in China […] 
The best practices of WHS management in this subsidiary have significantly improved the safety 









FROM GOVERNMENT-ORIENTATION TO COMMUNITY-ORIENTATION  
 
Research findings revealed that case MNEs also tried to adapt their behaviour and business strategies 
to the local institutional environment. Chinese expatriates interviewed told the researchers that their 
companies did not invest much time and energy to build a close relationship with government agencies 
in Australia when they understood the nature of government-enterprise relationship. Instead, they 
had paid more attention to building a good relationship with local communities. The manager of MNE4 
told the researchers: 
 
In China, all companies want to build a good relationship with local government agencies. When 
they meet difficulties, they tend to turn to government first. But in Australia, a good relationship 
with government does not mean a good relationship with local communities, whereas making 
local communities happy is more important. Therefore, our company has paid more attention 
to the relationship with local communities. 
 
The manager of MNE2 echoed the same idea, 
 
In Australia, social license is most important. Our company has made every effort to obtain full 
social support. A good relationship with local communities is earned by your local contributions, 
the local government cannot help you get this.  
 
FROM SILENT CSR TO OPEN CSR 
 
According to the Chinese culture, people should engage in charitable activities anonymously, that is, 
doing good deeds without leaving one’s name. Otherwise, you are viewed as self-interested since your 
charitable behavior might be only for your own good and doing good to earn a good reputation is not 
true kindness. Influenced by such a notion, case Chinese MNEs tended to engage in CSR activities 
silently and ignored to publicize their CSR achievements. In the interviews of recent years, we found 
that Chinese MNEs had emphasized the importance of letting others know their CSR performance and 
openly disseminated their CSR programs. One manager in MNE6told the researchers: 
 
In the beginning, we do not realize that we should publicize our CSR programs for corporate 
reputation. We think if we do so, it is not a true CSR effort since you are actually investing in 
your corporate reputation […] However, when local people demand that foreign companies 
must contribute to the local community, you have to let everyone know what your company has 
contributed so as to obtain social support. […] So, we learn from other companies and release 
a sustainability report every year to make public all our CSR activities.   
 
The CFO of MNE8 also told the researchers,  
 
It is not good practice for Chinese MNEs not to publicize their CSR contributions for good 
reputation. Chinese firms have not been well understood in Western countries. We should let 
people know that Chinese firms are also responsible investors and are contributing to local 









FROM THE CHINESE WAY TO THE BEST-FIT STRATEGY 
 
Interview findings revealed that case Chinese MNEs were confident about their business models since 
the models were proved successful in the Chinese market. Therefore, some case MNEs such as MNE1, 
MNE2, and MNE6 had initially tried to transfer their business models to their Australian subsidiaries 
and run these firms in the Chinese way. They soon found that this was not good practice given the 
huge difference between the Chinese and Australian workplaces. Therefore, these companies started 
to adopt business models that best fit the local environment and manage subsidiary locally. One board 
officer of MNE1 described the process to the researchers, 
 
Our firm has bought several companies through acquisition in Australia. In the beginning, the 
parent company sent many managers from China to cover key positions and attempted to run 
the subunits in the Chinese way […] However, using too many expatriates has led to inefficiency 
[…] Therefore, the head office has changed the policy, localized key positions and run them in 
the same way as other Australian companies.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study seeks to explore host-country informal institutions that shape the behaviour and strategies 
of expatriates and MNEs. Four local informal institutions were discussed, including the universalistic 
and impersonal government-enterprise relationship, the rights-based CSR, the zero-minute overtime 
norm, and giving health and safety the highest priority in the workplace. These norms are prevalent 
and widely accepted as appropriate and desirable patterns of action in Australia, and hence can be 
viewed as institutional. Although these norms shape the expectations of local stakeholders and the 
relationship of MNEs with government, local communities, and employees, they are tacit and taken 
for granted. MNEs failing to follow these conventions may invite public criticism or social sanction. 
This study also examines the potential influences of informal institutions on the behaviour of MNEs, 
and how Chinese expatriates and MNEs deal with the informal institutional differences between China 
and Australia.  
Our findings demonstrate that informal institutions of host countries, if not more significant, are as 
important as the host-country formal institutions and national cultures for MNEs. Informal institutions 
structure social expectations and attitudes, shape behaviour and management styles, and influence 
interactions and relationships. Without a correct understanding of informal institutions, an MNE could 
not comprehend the local institutional environment accurately. A better understanding of informal 
institutions in host countries can help MNEs make the right decision and avoid embarrassing 
misunderstanding and missteps. 
This research makes several theoretical contributions to the literature. First, it is among the limited 
studies analyzing Australian informal institutions and examining the interaction between MNEs and 
informal institutional characteristics based on first-hand qualitative evidence.  
Second, this research enriches our understanding of the relationship between formal and informal 
institutions. Helmke and Levitsky (2006, pp.13-18) identified four types of relationship between formal 
and informal institutions: complementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive. As discussed 
earlier, such an understanding is based on some hidden assumptions: informal institutions are less 
important than formal rules; they only serve as a subsidiary that fills gaps of formal regulations or 
modifies formal rules; informal institutions emerge only when formal rules are ineffective; and 
informal institutions function well only when the formal institutional environment is weak and 
unsuccessful. However, our study demonstrates that informal institutions can emerge in a strong 
institutional environment. For example, all the four informal institutions identified in this study emerge 




as results of a strong regulative environment. Without the support of formal regulations, no one 
knows whether these informal norms can emerge and function well or not. Conventional wisdom 
tends to assume informal institutions complement and enhance formal institutions, not vice versa. 
This research reveals a new relationship between formal and informal institutions, that is, strong 
formal institutions foster the emergence of similar and related informal institutions. Moreover, our 
study demonstrates that the emergence of informal institutions may encourage people to comply with 
similar and related formal institutions. For instance, without the norm of prioritizing workplace health 
and safety, the Australian Work Health and Safety Act might have not been strictly followed by local 
employees. Therefore, formal institutions should be sublimated into informal norms to ensure a high 
level of compliance. Sublimation here refers to the process of internalizing legal requirements into 
taken-for-granted patterns of action through socialization.  
Third, this study empirically identified and examined some informal institutions, which advances 
our understanding about informal institutions and the relationship between informal institution and 
national culture. Our analysis reveals that informal institution and culture are not synonymous. Culture 
generates and justifies informal institutions. Culture is one source, but not the only source, of informal 
institutions. 
This study has implications for government, MNEs, cross-cultural educators, and MNE scholars. For 
government, the relationships between formal and informal institutions can help government 
improve the enforcement of formal rules. Given that formal rules cannot function well without the 
support of informal institutions, and informal norms can emerge from a strong regulative 
environment, government can improve the effectiveness of formal rules through influencing or 
cultivating informal norms. For example, in order to help companies manage workplace health and 
safety effectively, the Safe Work Australia, a government agency, formulates various Model Codes of 
Practice to guide people to handle WHS issues. These codes of practice are not legally enforceable but 
have fostered the Australian society to form some WHS routines beyond the requirements of WHS 
laws.  
For MNEs and cross-cultural educators, our research demonstrates that informal institution and 
culture are not the same, and informal institutional characteristics of host countries shape the social 
expectations and behaviour of local stakeholders. Therefore, MNEs and cross-cultural educators 
should pay enough attention to such informal constraints, not just focus on the national culture and 
formal institutions of the host country. In addition, our research also helps new investors understand 
some major Australian informal institutional characteristics and generate strategies to address the 
complex local institutional environment. 
For MNE scholars, our study demonstrates that qualitative research can provide rich information 
regarding how informal institutions and MNEs interact in a host country. Exploring interactions of 
informal institutional characteristics and MNEs based on qualitative data can enrich and deepen our 
understanding of the institutional environment and the behaviour of MNEs. A longitudinal research 
design will enable researchers to capture the pattern and attitude changes.  
The major limitation of this study is that it is mainly based on perceptions of Chinese expatriates. 
To enrich and triangulate data, local managers, employees, government agencies and local 
communities should also be interviewed. Future research can improve the research design and 
conduct interviews more comprehensively. Interactions between MNEs and local institutional 
characteristics are a rich source for scholars. Future studies can identify more informal institutions and 
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